Note | 8 Strategies of the Supreme Leader for the New Phase of Battle

🔰 Note | 8 Strategies of the Supreme Leader for the New Phase of Battle 🔸 The end of military war does not necessarily mean the end of conflict. Sometimes, with the end of battle, the field of confrontation merely changes; from missiles and drones to economics, public opinion, decision-makers' calculations, social cohesion, and governance efficiency. 🔹 The set of messages and decrees from the Supreme Leader of the Revolution in the months following the third imposed war can be viewed from this perspective. When these messages are placed side by side, they do not form a collection of occasional recommendations; rather, they provide a relatively cohesive picture of the requirements for managing the country in the new phase of battle. 1. Preserving national unity as the infrastructure of power 🔸 The first and perhaps the most frequently mentioned strategy is the protection of social cohesion. In various messages, unity is introduced not merely as a moral or political recommendation but rather as part of national power capacity. If the enemy seeks to erode resilience and create a rift between the people and the regime, preventing division and turning disputes into conflicts becomes strategically important. 2. Making the economy and livelihood the priority of governance 🔹 Economic stability, inflation reduction, liquidity management, production revitalization, employment, and solving livelihood concerns are not merely economic policies. A society that has more confidence in its economic future will be able to withstand external pressures more effectively. The livelihood of the people is part of national security. 3. Reconstructing governance with a focus on efficiency and problem-solving 🔸 Post-war messages emphasize the need for institutions to move beyond bureaucracy and toward problem-solving. The parliament, government, and judiciary must demonstrate their performance in the real lives of the people. Public trust cannot be maintained solely through political positions; people must see the results of governance. 4. Trusting authorities and utilizing the capacity of foreign policy 🔹 Negotiation is not rejected, but negotiation does not imply acceptance of the opponent's views. The experience of the United States violating commitments has also shown the importance of assessing the credibility of promises. Diplomacy should be a tool of foreign policy, not a substitute for national power or a basis for naive trust. 5. Protecting society and the regime against cognitive and media warfare 🔸 In a war where the goal is to create errors in calculations and weaken resilience, the field of narrative becomes important. Society must have the capacity to discern news, analysis, psychological operations, and directed narratives, and decision-makers must not make decisions under the influence of emotional atmospheres. 6. Transforming the people from "audience of politics" to "active component of national power" 🔹 The people are not merely an audience to policies. Their human, scientific, economic, cultural, and social capacities are part of the country's power. Grassroots networks, jihadist groups, and social participation can enhance resistance capacities in hybrid warfare beyond governmental capabilities. 7. Maintaining military superiority alongside developing capabilities to counter new threats 🔸 The new phase of battle does not mean diminishing the importance of defensive power. Combat readiness must develop alongside informational dominance, technology, training, human resources, and countering cognitive and hybrid threats. The experience of war should lead to a redesign of the concept of defensive readiness. 8. Connecting domestic power with regional positioning and new order 🔹 The Persian Gulf, the Hormuz Strait, neighbors, the resistance front, and the relations of the nations in the region are all part of Iran's strategic environment. The ultimate goal is not only to maintain the achievements of the war domestically but to transform Iran's power into a component for shaping a new regional order. * The main issue is managing "the day after the war" 🔸 If we place the messages of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution together, a common logic becomes clear: military warfare marks the end of one phase, and the next phase involves competition over economics, public trust, social cohesion, governance efficiency, the strength of narratives, independent calculations, and Iran's regional standing. 🔹 Therefore, the new phase of battle is not merely a return to the previous situation; it should be an opportunity for a comprehensive reconfiguration of national power based on the experience of war. The parliament should become more issue-oriented, the government should prioritize livelihood and stability, the judiciary should make justice tangible in people's lives, armed forces should prepare for new threats, and the media should take the field of narrative seriously. 🔸 If the enemy has changed the battle field after military defeat, Iran's response must also shift from defense against attacks to comprehensive reconfiguration of national power. Military victory is merely the starting point; its consolidation depends on the country's ability to manage the economy, maintain cohesion, reform governance, and protect society against hybrid warfare. ➕ Read the full note here.